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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 21/03/2006 Accident number: 62 
Accident time: 07:05 Accident Date: 18/11/1996 
Where it occurred: Chipeta to Catabola 
power line, Bie 
Country: Angola 
Primary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Excavation accident Date of main report: 19/11/1996 
ID original source: PH Internal Name of source: INAROEE 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PPM-2 AP blast Ground condition: hidden root mat 
Date record created: 23/01/2004 Date  last modified: 23/01/2004 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: not recorded Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
squatting/kneeling to excavate (?) 
vegetation clearance problem (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
 
Accident report 
The demining group issued frontal protection and their drills assumed the deminer would 
kneel or squat while excavating. 
An internal demining group (signed by the Programme Manager) was on file at the Angola 
MAC. The following summarises its content.  
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The demining group were using Ebinger 535 detectors at the time. 1,139 mines had been 
found on the site prior to the accident and the victim had cleared two on the morning [in half of 
one hour?] prior to the accident. 
The report gave a timetable of events which indicated that the team started work at 06:00 and 
the accident occurred at 07:05 when the victim "prodded onto" a PPM-2. By 07:09 the victim 
had been carried to a safe area by two colleagues and was receiving treatment from the 
medic. The deminer "took deep blast wound to the area between the thumb and forefinger" of 
his left hand. The medic did not administer painkillers but "packs wound on the hand".  
Painkillers were avoided because the victim was "unconscious and suffering head injuries" - 
described as "extensive injuries to his face". At 07:15 the ambulance picked up the victim and 
at 08:45 the victim arrived at Kuito hospital. Air evacuation to an eye clinic in Luanda was 
arranged and the victim arrived there at 15:15. 
The first deminer on the scene reported that the victim's visor was lying close by with no 
damage. It was decided that the deminer had removed his visor prior to the accident. The 
mine was believed to have been buried to "around 3 to 6cm" in 1986. Many of those found 
were in "very poor condition". There were many roots in the area the deminer was working 
and the presence of the roots may have been the cause of the victim using "too much 
force….or an incorrect probe angle". The probe was bent into "a bow shape". The deminer's 
frag vest cover was not penetrated. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the accident occurred because the deminer was either 
prodding at the wrong angle, prodding aggressively, or combining both errors. They said that 
this was a breach of their SOPs. They found that the victim's injuries were "greatly 
exacerbated" by not wearing a visor. The Casevac was described as going "very well". 
 
Recommendations 
The report noted that this accident was "at least the fifth" that had occurred with PPM-2s while 
prodding in Angola. It recommended additional supervision with frequent refresher courses, 
more practice for Casevac, and that breaches of safety procedures should be dealt with as 
"extremely serious". 
 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 85 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 10 hours 10 minutes 
Protection issued: Long visor 
Short frontal vest 
Protection used: Short frontal vest 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES 
severe Eyes 
severe Face 
severe Hand 
2 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Eye  
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as a "Field control inadequacy" because the 
deminer was working improperly and not wearing his visor despite the fact that the demining 
group involved claimed to wear closed visors at all times while in a mined area. Leaving the 
visor aside entirely implies that the victim was confident that he would not be observed by 
field supervisors, in which case supervision was unacceptably slack.  
The delay before the victim reached surgical facilities illustrates both the difficulties or working 
in Angola and a management failing in making appropriate provision for CASEVAC. Better 
provision was possible because other groups made better provision at the same time. 
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